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Soldiers: Taylan Book 1 [A. Murtagh] on oburyxocel.tk *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Four very different people are taken from four very different lives, .
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Open Preview See a Problem? Details if other :. Thanks for telling us about the problem. Return to Book Page. Preview — Soldiers by A. Soldiers Taylan, 1 by A. Murtagh Goodreads Author. Four very different people are taken from four very different lives, and must learn to love the duty that is the reason they exist. Barely adults but already following separate paths, Erik, Elena, Lefu and Jing-Mai won't get to see any of their plans become reality. Attacked and abducted, the four strangers are Four very different people are taken from four very different lives, and must learn to love the duty that is the reason they exist.system-amz-es-supprt-csmail.dns04.com/map48.php
Justin R. Taylan - Series Creator
Attacked and abducted, the four strangers are plucked from their lives and awaken in a tree-house high in the jungle, with no phones, no wallets and no memory of the journey. Their captor, a frightening woman who calls herself Anna, refuses to answer their questions, simply setting them bizarre tasks that confuse them even more. Anna only reveals the truth when the situation grows too tense to continue. Before their disbelieving eyes, she transforms herself into a nightmarish creature, telling them they are the same as she.
Their race is called the Taylan, and they are the enforcers of the Treaty in a war which is literally as old as time. A war in which the earth serves as both barricade and battleground. And as they attempt to come to terms with their new roles, Anna is forced to tell them something else: an unknown power wants them dead, and even she can't trace the source of the threat Get A Copy. Paperback , pages. More Details Other Editions 1. Friend Reviews.
To see what your friends thought of this book, please sign up. To ask other readers questions about Soldiers , please sign up. Lists with This Book. This book is not yet featured on Listopia. Community Reviews. Showing Rating details. More filters. Sort order. Aug 04, Laura rated it it was amazing Recommends it for: Fantasy readers. Erik, Lefu, Elena and Jing-Mai come from all walks of life, barely adults and about to start the rest of their lifes, when they are all snatched from their homes and awake in a treehouse in the woods.
Murtagh writes relatable, real and very attractive already dreaming who would play them in the film version characters. The story is original, with a whole new Erik, Lefu, Elena and Jing-Mai come from all walks of life, barely adults and about to start the rest of their lifes, when they are all snatched from their homes and awake in a treehouse in the woods.
The story is original, with a whole new world being opened up but explained in a perfect way, as the characters themselves are fresh to this world, we see everything as they do, new and scary. The writing itself is dazzling, the descriptive passages are glorious and with the teens dealing with everyday problems as well as their new identities, there is much humour to contrast with the unavoiable darkness that comes with their strange lifes. An accomplished novel for those who like fantasy and for those who have yet to try it. Simon rated it liked it Jan 03, Chris Harcourt rated it it was amazing Dec 29, Derek Gillespie rated it it was amazing Sep 30, Christina McMullen rated it it was amazing Jan 06, Mae marked it as to-read Sep 16, Hafsa is currently reading it Sep 16, Oscar nahunja added it Sep 17, This mode of accumulation, generally known as 'import-substitution industrialisation', I will refer to as 'the mode of accumulation based on the internal market', for reasons which need not detain us here.
The basis of this mode of accumulation, itself a definite stage in the development of the capitalist mode of production in backward countries, lies in the concentration of capital, both foreign and native, in those branches of social production which have as outlets the internal market. The reason is easy to discover: for the new fledged industrial capital of these countries, competition on the world market with the highly concentrated and centralised imperialist capital is excluded in the initial stages of its development.
The home market is a much easier playground, not only because of the proximity of the market to production sites and the much readier flow of information, but also because the state can provide native capital with much higher protection than would be the case on the world market. In the case of Turkey, as in some other countries, this mode of accumulation was, in fact, a heritage of the state-capitalist stage which had itself been based, with a few exceptions, on the production of consumer goods for the home market.
In this sense, apart from the interregnum of the period immediately after the war, Turkish capitalism had a rather stable path of development over the half century that stretched from the early thirties to the late seventies. There were, however, important differences between the state-capitalist stage and the later period. First, obviously, private capital took precedence over the state sector, if not in absolute quantitative terms, at least in relative weight; and, qualitatively speaking, its orientation was determining in the priorities of economic policies.
Secondly, the sectoral composition of industrial production changed: from the primary consumption goods of the thirties, production was gradually extended to consumer durables and transport equipment, pharmaceuticals and other chemicals, petroleum refining etc. The share of food and beverages and textiles the two sectors which develop generally at the initial stages of industrialisation in total manufacturing had fallen from 57 per cent in to 30 per cent in , the lowest such share among Islamic Middle Eastern countries.
Here was, again, on a different level, an expression of the necessity of state productive activity, which alone could hope to cope with the high degree of development of productive forces on the world scale. A graphic expression of this situation is the fact that average production scales in the state sector are as high as nine times those in the modern private sector. This was, of course, a result of the radically different nature of the conjuncture ruling on the capitalist world market.
The sixties and the seventies were a period of rapid capital accumulation in Turkey. The overall growth rate of the economy, which was approximately 5. Although the number of small enterprises is still overwhelming in the Turkish economy, the determining sector as concerns production and employment has certainly become large-scale modern industry. In the s and s big monopolies control most markets and large holding companies-conglomerates active in many branches of industry, commerce, banking etc.
This rapid accumulation of capital was inseparably bound up with the general expansion of the capitalist world economy and can in no way be attributed to a supposed success of the economic policies pursued by the governments in power during this period. These policies were quite standard when seen in a comparative light. The main elements were: a high rate of protection of the internal market from international competition, through the simultaneous use of tariffs and quantitative restrictions; 18 a fixed exchange-rate system whereby the national currency was, in general, kept overvalued with respect to its market rate; low interest rates fixed by the state, which provided industrial capital with low-cost financial funds; widespread state investment; large scale state subsidies to elements of both variable and constant capital; heavy dependence on foreign money capital credit etc.
There was one specific aspect of the Turkish scene, however, about which a few words ought to be said. This was planning. A combined result of the experience of the thirties and the demands of the industrial bourgeoisie and of international financial organisations in the fifties against the chaos in economic policy that reigned under the DP, the State Planning Organisation was set up in the wake of the coup. It was to prepare, under the control of successive governments, four five-year plans in the period to , of which the fourth was scrapped in the turmoil of the economic crisis that set in in These plans were wider in scope than the so-called 'industrialisation plans' of the s in that they were not restricted to the industrial sector but encompassed the whole range of economic and social activities.
Turkish planning bore, of course, no resemblance to socialist planning in the context of sociaIised means of production - for, as is euphemistically put, the plans were 'imperative' only for the public sector, but 'indicative' for the private. Furthermore, from the very beginning the planning authorities opted for a very heavy dependence on the price mechanism, with the implication that the plans were only second-rate buttresses for the failures of the law of value. With this orientation it should come as no surprise that plans in fact did not lead the economy but were, on the contrary, guided by it.
TROUGH OUT this period of high growth when industrial capital flourished, capital accumulation was gradually and increasingly coming up against certain barriers. These barriers first became apparent in the late s and were increasingly insurmountable by the time of the deep crisis of capital accumulation in the late s.
Before going on to a concrete analysis of the development of capital accumulation and class struggles during the period , I will point in this section to the various contradictions of the process of accumulation that shaped the struggles of the period. The post system This system was the product of a very specific conjuncture of class struggles.
Its origins can be traced, as we have seen, to the struggle of an urban coalition, led by the rising industrial bourgeoisie, to dominate the rural majority represented by the DP. Apart from planning, which expressed the domination of the industrial fraction of the bourgeoisie over economic policy, the system had as its basis the constitution and the legislation concerning labour relations. The constitution also stipulated a quite advanced range of political and civil rights and liberties.
It included a directive for future governments for carrying out a land reform. Finally, and most importantly, it constitutionalised the rights to form trade unions, to engage in collective bargaining and to strike, which rights were concretised through the legislation of Being the product of a political event controlled by the military, the constitution had to bear its imprint. Several aspects of the constitution and notably the extended powers granted to the National Security Board not to be confused with the military junta, the National Security Council , a body composed of the top army staff and some members of the government, gave the military a real authority over the government itself.
Apart from the limitations inherent in the constitution, the shadow of the military was constantly cast over political life, be it in the form of successive abortive coups in the early s or the formation of seditious military committees including members of the general staff. And, of course, the three presidents of the period, all of them former generals, truly acted as the Trojan horse of the military within civilian institutions. Finally, a Mussolini-inspired Penal Code and a pervasive anti-communist ideological atmosphere acted as a Damocles' sword over the political self-organisation of the working class.
Despite all these drawbacks, the post system was to be the framework of the most democratic era in the history of the republic. This was fundamentally due to one fact of colossal importance: the massive and active entry of the working class and other labouring strata into the political scene for the first time in Turkish history.
The working class had suffered constant repression at the hands of the Kemalist leadership. Despite its demagogic rhetoric before rising to power, the DP turned out to be no better: the year following the elections, mass arrests of left-wing leaders and militants dispelled any illusions nurtured by sections of the left as to the 'liberal' nature of this party. So the working class entered the post period politically passive, organised as it was only in a trade-union structure heavily tied to the state and with no right to strike.
However, the fact that it was part and parcel of the urban coalition as a passive support class, along with the influence of liberal ideas circulating in petty-bourgeois circles in the late s, was instrumental in the creation of a legal framework conducive to working class activity. But the legal framework was secondary in importance when matched against the real mobilisation of the working class.
The decade of the s witnessed a gradual tendency of the working class to move towards organisational, political and ideological independence from both bourgeois parties and the state. We need not go into the details of this process here. This event was a watershed of decisive importance in the history of class struggles in Turkey. It implied the forceful entry into the scene of the working class and demonstrated to the bourgeoisie and to the army that this class was, henceforth, the main antagonist with which it had to contend.
This new strength of the working class was becoming, in the eyes of the bourgeoisie, more and more of a burden for the accumulation of capital. Strikes were growing in number and militancy, new demands were being put forward, and real wages were on the rise. One result was that, by limiting super-exploitation, these developments reduced the competitiveness of Turkish capital on the world market, since low wages are the precondition of such competitiveness for the weak and technologically backward capital of semi-industrialised countries.
This, along with other factors, impeded the growth of industrial exports, which fact was to have important consequences, as we shall see. Here, then, was an unexpected consequence of the post system, the historical task of which was to have been the consolidation of the domination of the industrial bourgeoisie over the rural majority. The new situation dictated that the mobilisation of the working class, of sections of the peasantry and of various other social layers be suppressed and a new straitjacket of authoritarianism be imposed on political life.
This was precisely one of the missions of the military intervention of , which, having amended many articles of the constitution and other legislation, totally failed, however, to destroy the rise of the working class movement. This movement was to experience a renewed ascendancy in the s which, incidentally, shows that the post system was not a legal but a political order of things. The resurgence of massive proletarian activity proved to the bourgeoisie conclusively that partial adjustments of the political framework were insufficient and that the entire post system had to be discarded in the interests of capital accumulation.
This awareness was to be decisive in the coup of and its aftermath. The problem of rural alliances The limits of the Kemalist revolution manifest themselves nowhere with more force than in the sphere of agricultural property relations. We have already seen that the Kemalist state was, from the beginning, based on an alliance with the landowning classes. This ruled out an agrarian revolution and left intact the structure of property relations: a massive small-holding peasantry, some modern farms organised along capitalist lines, widespread absentee ownership and, finally, quasi-feudal relations in the Kurdish regions of the East and the Southeast.
The result would be a very unequal development in agriculture: while there was a certain overall development, the real breakthrough into modern agriculture came only in the West and the South, Kurdistan and most of the centre remaining quite backward economically and socially.
As a consequence, despite the fact that Turkey has generally been regarded as one of the few countries of the world which are self-sufficient in foodstuffs, the potential in agricultural production has remained far from being exploited to the full and the increase of the productivity of agricultural labour has, on the whole, been poor. This limitation influenced industrial accumulation adversely by keeping agricultural exports lower than they could potentially be, by raising the price of foodstuffs and thereby increasing the value of labour power, by keeping the internal market narrower than it need be etc.
Hence, a low agricultural surplus has been one of the essential weaknesses of Turkish capitalism. This is why the question of a 'land reform' has been haunting the Turkish bourgeoisie since the mid-thirties. But successive attempts in , after the coup of , during the military intervention of etc.
There are two fundamental reasons for these failures.
First, as its counterparts in other countries where capitalism developed belatedly, the Turkish commercial bourgeoisie was congenitally tied up with rural property: a merchant was also a landlord more often than not. And secondly, even for those fractions of the bourgeoisie for which such was not the case, alliance with the big landowners against the threat of subaltern classes was too pressing an issue to be overlooked. The price for the industrial bourgeoisie was, of course, quite high in terms of the limits to capital accumulation.
But the problem was not only one of low growth of the agricultural surplus. Equally important were the difficulties the bourgeoisie faced in the transfer of the existing agricultural surplus to the industrial sector. Here the problems were raised to a power for there was the additional factor of the communality of interests among various rural classes.
Leaving aside rural proletarians, whose ranks have been growing over the decades, and semi-proletarians and poor peasants, the other classes and class fractions in the countryside, i. The experience of the RPP, which had tried to use both instruments during the war, taught bourgeois parties a precious lesson. Despite its attempt at regaining the confidence of rural classes by removing the bulk of wartime taxes on agriculture, the RPP was toppled by a predominantly rural coalition.
The DP struck the final blow by abolishing the remaining taxes and to this day no civilian government has even attempted to impose direct taxation on agriculture. The means used to achieve this singular result by successive governments was to keep support prices high. The notable exception to this general trend came during the military intervention of when the terms of trade of agriculture fell because of low support prices, 23 while, ironically, world prices of primary commodities rose as a result of the speculative over-heating of the world economy on the eve of the recession of For the rest of the s, coalitions of different political persuasion competed for the favours of rural classes by keeping support prices high, and, during certain years, extremely high.
This was certainly one reason why, at the end of the decade, rural masses participated very little in the struggles that shook Turkey. This was effected mainly through the inherent transfer of surplus-value from agriculture to industry due to differences in organic composition and accessorily through the high prices of industrial commodities due to protection. Necessary for the reproduction of the political domination of the bour- geoisie, its alliance with the landowning classes imposed a serious barrier to the extended reproduction of industrial capital.
The question of foreign capital One major difference of the Turkish case from those other countries which, in the postwar period, experienced a certain capitalist develop- ment oriented to the internal market is the relatively low rate ofpenetra- tion by foreign productive capital. However, even this latter figure is not insignificant for our purposes, for it is this that represents the bulk, though not the entirety, of the stock of foreign capital invested in manufacturing industry the rest being mainly concentrated in the petroleum industry.
It is true that apart from direct investment, other types of relations exist between foreign and Turkish capital, such standard relations as patents, licensing etc. It is also true that in some key sectors such as the automotive, pharmaceutical, petro-chemical, rubber industries, foreign capital, in partnership with Turkish capital, does exercise a powerful domination. Nonetheless, in the light of the experience of other countries, this specificity should not go unnoticed. This situation is the result of a confluence of various factors.
Historically speaking, the initial reluctance offoreign capital can be attri- buted to the fact that Turkey was one of the first Eastern, non-Christian countries to establish an independent bourgeois nation-state based on the repression of the other nationalities living on the Anatolian plateau, as we have seen. Not having yet accumulated the astute methods of neo-colonialism, it was natural for foreign capital to regard this strange country with suspicion and this despite the constant reassurances and signs of good-will on the part of its leaders. The postwar period might have changed this situation were it not for several important factors.
For one thing, the geographical proximity of Turkey to the Soviet Union, while raising its importance militarily for Western strategic purposes, was a deterrent for would-be investors in the light of the expansion of the Soviet zone of influence in the aftermath of the war. Secondly, these decades witnessed a progressive development of demo- cratic forms in Turkey and later a powerful rise of the workers' move- ment and these were not exactly what foreign capital looked for in back- ward countries. Thirdly, from the sixties. Integration hence took the form of an opposite flow of labour power from Turkey to West Germany and other countries.
Finally, the economic policies pursued in harmony with the pattern of accumulation based on the internal market acted as a disincentive: particularly important was the overvaluation of the Turkish currency with respect to its market rate, which automatically decreased the buying power of foreign money capital within Turkey and hence caused the prospects of profitability to decline. The consequences of this situation were numerous, but concerning the discussion with respect to the barriers to capital accumulation two can be singled out.
On the one hand, a relatively low penetration of foreign productive capital implied that Turkish capitalism would find it harder than countries in an opposite situation to turn to industrial exports. Foreign firms, and especially multinational ones, have, with their global network of communications, their developed techniques of exploitation and their generally more advanced technology, a greater capacity to export to international markets, at least potentially. On the other hand, lacking foreign resources in the form of direct investments, Turkish capitalism depended to an enormous extent on the flow of foreign money capital, i.
The Turkish monopoly bourgeoisie felt, of course, quite bitter about its relative deprivation of the opportunity of association with imperialist capital. With the accumulation of other difficulties, the eradication of the causes which created this situation became increasingly urgent for the bourgeoisie. Internal contradictions of the mode of accumulation The mode of accumulation based on the internal market has, with the exception of some insular economies such as Taiwan and Hong Kong, been a universally necessary stage in the development of industrial capitalism in backward countries.
Turkish capitalism was no exception. There, too, the accumulation of capital was, in an unmediated way, also the accumulation of contradictions. We have already seen that the mode of capital accumulation in question is predominantly concentrated in those branches of industry whether in Department two, in the initial phase, or in Department one, in the later phase which have as outlets internal consumption.
But the internal market of a single country, whatever its population, is manifestly insufficient, all the more so in an underdeveloped country, for scales of production implied by the modern productive forces as they have been developed on the world scale. Consequently, the productive units established under these conditions are inevitably smaller in scale, more backward technologically, offering much more restricted opportunities for capital's control over labour, when compared with their international counterparts. In the Turkish case, for instance, a comparison between average scales of large Turkish private firms and 'optimal' international scales showed that the ratio was in steel ingots, in aluminium plate, in electric motors, in cement and tractors and in passenger cars.
The resulting low productivity of labour implied that Turkish capital had a very feeble competitive power on international markets. But whatever the mode of capital accumulation, every capitalist economy is inextricably connected to the capitalist world economy in a definite, albeit specific, way. Therefore, competitiveness on the world market is a sine qua non of the unhampered reproduction of every capitalist economy. At a certain stage the law of value imposes its rule over every national fraction of capital.
The mediations of the national state or of the inflow offoreign money capital can alleviate problems for a certain while. But unless an increase in competitiveness, dependent ultimately upon the productivity of labour, is procured in the meanwhile, a crisis in the end is inevitable. This crisis of the mode of accumulation based on the internal market is a specific expression of a wider truth: that, in this age ofimperialism, capitalism in one country is no more viable than socialism in one country. The concrete modalities in which various countries experience this bitter truth may differ.
In the case of Turkey, it expressed itself in the contradiction between the low growth of exports and the rapid growth of imports due to the assembly nature of production activities, which therefore required a high importation rate of raw materials and inter- mediate goods, in addition to means of production, which are usually unavailable internally at the initial stages of capitalist development.
Total Turkish exports increased by 5 per cent annually in the period following , but imports soared ahead at a rate of growth of 15 per cent in the same period. There were, certainly, additional factors in the slow growth of exports and especially of industrial exports. One very important factor, generally neglected, was the rise in real wages due to working class struggles, already noted. This made impossible for Turkish capital the alleviation of the disadvantage arising from low productivity and acted as a strong deterrent against its turn to international markets.
A change in the mode of accumulation was therefore predicated on the infliction of a defeat on the working class. Other factors already noted are the relatively low penetration offoreign productive capital and the mediocre development in agriculture. These policies, notably high protection, overvalued currency with respect to the market rate and financial policies that expand the internal market, promoted the perpetuation of the existing mode of accumulation and acted as disincentives against a turn to inter- national markets.
Adequate to the needs of industrial capital at a certain stage of its development, they were transformed into so many barriers once the conditions that produced them had been surpassed.
It was also a period of extremely rapid change in the lineup of class forces and of a fundamental upheaval in the political scene. My purpose here is not to provide a detailed analysis of the complex process through which the country went in these two decades but rather to sketch a general framework in order to under- stand the evolution of class struggles and class alliances, which culminated in the successful coup of 12 September The chaos of political life in this period cannot be made intelligible unless the concrete relations between all the different classes are taken into account.
Ther are, however, two key factors that shaped the evolution of the political struggles and alliances of the period. One is the forceful entry into the political scene of the working class. The other is the relationship of the increasingly dominant element in the ruling bloc, the industrial bourgeoisie, to the other elements of this bloc, in particular the rural propertied classes.
The history of these two turbulent decades has been moulded by the oscillating efforts of the big industrial bourgeoisie to sail between the Scylla and Charybdis of these two social forces. The resulting formation and dissolution of class alliances and coalitions have given each phase of the process its particular hue.
We shall see that the difference between the s and the s derives mainly from such a revision of class alliances.
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The rise in the militancy of the working class, especially marked in the second half of the sixties, called forth two different, and diametrically opposite, reactions from bourgeois political forces. One was the gradual transformation of the RPP into a populist party, exchanging its image of the guarantor of the state for one in which the party posed as the defender of the weak and the oppressed. The avowed project of the new current, led by Ecevit, was the construction of a social democratic party along the lines of the parties of the Socialist International, but various historical factors, relating both to the party and to society at large, acted as powerful barriers to this project.
When the coup arrived the RPP had not yet been able to establish durable organisational links with the working class. The second reaction was reaction, pure and simple. Starting around , there was a proliferation of so-called Associations for the Struggle against Communism, a common front of many right-wing currents. Waging violent attacks on left-wing demonstrations and meetings, these Associations were instrumental in the formation of the nucleus of what was to become the most powerful fascist party in postwar Europe, the Nationalist Action Party NAP.
This party, which was to engage in full- scale violence and murder against trade-unionists, left-wing militants, students, teachers etc. It stood for a frontal offensive aiming at the atomisation of the class and the abolition of the political system i. In fact, the industrial bourgeoisie had joined the other fractions of the class in the second half of the s in criticising the post system and the constitution. The main reason was, of course, that the post system increasingly came to stand for the self-activity of the working masses.
Another concurrent factor was the reorganisation that had occurred within bourgeois political forces after the coup. Over- whelmed by the rural majority represented politically by the DP, the industrial bourgeoisie had, before the coup, joined hands with the RPP and the military in toppling the former. However, with the formation of the Justice Party JP in place of the DP dissolved by the military, and especially with the rise to its leadership of De mire 1 in , the industrial bourgeoisie had acquired domination within that political tradition which was the historical inheritor of the DP movement.
Thus, a decade after its birth, the urban coalition was split, for the main force behind its formation was now the leader of a political movement that brought together the different fractions of the bourgeoisie and dominated the rural masses. The industrial bourgeoisie now had the majority on its side and, therefore, its political representatives came increasingly into conflict with the various checks and balances placed in the constitution of in order to curb the powers of the parliamentary majority.
But this 'golden age' of bourgeois unity under the dominance of its industrial fraction was to be temporary. The rural bourgeoisie could not digest the new priorities of the JP with its wholesale emphasis on industrial accumulation. Demirel's meek attempts at indirectly taxing landed property in brought out to the open the contradiction through a major split from the JP. Another fraction of the bourgeoisie, mainly composed of the medium and small capitalists particularly of provincial towns, came increasingly into conflict with the monopoly capital of Istanbul and other big cities over the distribution of bank credits and import quotas.
This conflict would lead to the formation of another political movement, the National Salvation Party NSP , which was to gain its real momentum in the s. Due to the deep-seated ties of monopoly capital with American and European imperialist capital, the NSP would increasingly criticise Turkey's relations with the West, advocate the integration of Turkey with the Arab-Muslim world and develop a fundamentalist Islamic ideology.
Thus, in , the industrial bourgeoisie found itselfin a contradictory situation. On the one hand, the June events, in which around , workers had participated, confirmed the serious rise in the working class movement and the general radicalisation of the mass movement. Against this the bourgeoisie had developed the twin tendencies of inflicting a defeat on the working class movement and of rolling back the post system by revising the constitution.
But precisely at this moment when the bourgeoisie needed to gather its strength to impose its solutions, the forces of the bourgeoisie were extremely divided. Not fortuitously: for these divisions were an expression of the relative exhaustion of the rapid accumulation of capital in the s.
The industrial growth rate, which had been around 11 per cent on the average in the years between and , fell in to 1. This was also the year of balance of payments problems and of the devaluation of the currency in August. In short, the industrial bourgeoisie had to wage a battle on two fronts simul- taneously: it had to attack both the working class and the rural propertied classes. With no strong allies left for the formidable burden of these tasks, it had to take refuge once again under the coercive power of the military.
The pronunciamento of 12 March did not abolish parliament but resulted in the formation of successive governments which were emanations of the will of the military. This second episode of military intervention lasted two and a half years. Hegel's famous dictum that the same historical event occurs twice is amply confirmed when one compares the period and the military dictatorship. With one important proviso: this time it was the first episode that was a farce and the second which turned out to be a tragedy.
It is not necessary to go into a detailed analysis of the ludicrous failure of the military intervention of Having momentarily repressed the working class movement, it gradually capitulated to the representatives of the big landowning classes and, therefore, failed to bring any solutions to the emerging crisis of the mode of accumulation the graphic examle of its failure being the frustration of the much-publicised attempt to carry out a land reform.
Neither could it roll back the rising tide of working class and urban petty-bourgeois mass mobilisation which reasserted itself with increased vigour once military tutelage over political life was lifted. The pressure of European institutions was important in the return to parliamentary democracy, for at this stage Turkish capital had its eyes turned exclusively to Europe. So apart from a two-year squeeze of real wages and agricultural support prices, and various amendments to the constitution which however proved insignificant in the face of rising mass mobilisation, the 'achievements' of the military intervention were nil.
The twofold task of rolling back working class mobilisation and, simultaneously, rationalising Turkish capitalism in the face of opposition from the big landowning classes and the ante diluvian fraction of merchant capital thus remained on the agenda of the Turkish industrial bourgeoisie during the s.
But it found a different expression in the political sphere with respect to the late s. The JP, which had been split as a result of its one-sided emphasis on the interests of the industrial monopoly fraction of capital, turned towards a strategy that aimed at the unity of all propertied classes and at the repression of the renewed militancy ofleft-wing movements. The RPP gradually came to represent the other horn of the dilemma that faced the industrial bourgeoisie: it became more and more a party with a modern image, which, basing itself on the quest for a hegemony over the working class, the new layers of the urban proletariat, the urban petty- bourgeoisie and the poor peasantry, promised the industrial bourgeoisie to deal with the more backward relics of the agricultural and commercial propertied classes.
The result was twofold. On the one hand, the industrial bourgeoisie itself was split over the priorities of the moment and therefore over the party to be supported. On the other, the society at large experienced a profound political polarisation around two blocs, the main forces of which were the RPP and the JP.
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This polarisation was carried to the brink of civil war by mass political terror, initiated and constantly rekindled by the fascist movement. Finally, superposed to this dramatic general context was the consideable rise of a nationalist movement with left-wing sympathies in Turkish Kurdistan. The political situation was, hence, already explosive and none of the important questions solved when a profound crisis of capital accumulation set in around As such it combined various aspects, which should be analysed separately in order to have a clear understanding of the situation.
The crisis can be considered as the complex unity of three essential moments:. The three cycles of the postwar period were between , and to the present, marked by recessions respectively between , , and from on. All of these periodic crises resulted in stabilisation programmes accompanied by devaluations of the currency, in , in and continuously from to the present. The recent crisis was thus a new episode in the lineage of a well-established pattern. However, every periodic crisis of capital accumulation brings capital face to face with specific contradictions, along with more general ones common to all crises.
The crisis was the moment in which the primacy of agriculture was put to trial. The recession was a precocious warning as to the limits of the mode of accumulation based on the internal market. Both caused severe disruptions in economic activity and contributed, in their different manners, to political upheavals. But neither was as profound and pervasive as the present crisis and especially the recession was short-lived. They both occurred within the context of the great postwar boom of world capitalism, whose effects soon gave Turkish capitalism a new impetus. If the periodic crisis that started in has turned out to be much deeper and long-lasting than the former two episodes, the reason is that it was articulated to, and expressed, new contradictions arising both on a world scale and within the Turkish economy itself.
These harriers made themselves felt for the first time during the recession of We have seen that the military intervention of was an unsuccessful attempt to solve these problems of industrial accumulation. However, in spite of this failure, a host of special circumstances concurred to make the first half of the decade a period of reinvogirated economic growth.
Foremost among these factors was the effect of the overheating of the capitalist world economy, on the eve of the crisis, in the years and , when the world market expanded by a leap and the prices of primary commodities were given a boost due to speculative stockpiling. This was the period of a record increase in the exports of many semi-industria1ised countries.
Turkish capital also benefited from this favourable conjuncture. Its total exports made an imponant leap, but more importantly, manufacturing exports grew to an unprecedented extent. The real growth in this specific item was practically nil in the s. Between and there was a cumulative 36 per cent real growth. Although this may have been instrumental, its effects were only subsidiary, the principal factor being the situation on the world market. The squeeze on wages during this period should not be forgotten either.
A second special circumstance in the early s was the immense increase in the remittances of immigrant workers from Turkey working in capitalist Europe. But with the abrupt change in world conditions after , the contradictions of this mode of accumulation resurfaced forcefully. The impact of the crisis was felt sharply in Turkey through the drop in workers' remittances as a result of rising unemployment and stagnant wage levels in Europe, the sharp rise in oil prices in and again in , the more general unfavourable change in Turkey's terms of trade with the outside world, the stagnation of exports due to the slow growth and even the contraction of the world market.
But like other countries, Turkey experienced the global crisis of capitalism at a specific tempo and under specific forms. The situation is even more striking if one turns to private capital investment, the single most important index of capital accumulation: this decreased constantly from on, to drop by to the level which had been reached in The determining aspect of the complex character of this crisis was the postponed crisis of the mode of accumulation and the concurrent pattern ofintegration of the economy to the capitalist world economy.
This, as we have already noted, was not specific to the case of Turkey but was, in fact, the general pattern in the postwar era in those backward countries where a development of indusrial capitalism had occurred between and However, this pattern had been gradually changing and a new pattern of integration of these countries to the world economy coming on the agenda in the s.
The forerunners of the new pattern were the so- called 'export-led' economies of South Korea and Brasil not to speak of the special cases of Taiwan and Hong Kong in the s. They were followed in the s by many Latin American countries, the most spectacular changes being observed in the countries of the South Cone, Chile, Uruguay and Argentina, and other Asian countries. The former mode of accumulation based on the partition of the world market for industrial commodities into well-protected national markets was being surpassed on the world scale.
The general contours of a new international division oflabour were slowly taking shape. Within this new division of labour, these semi-industrialised countries came more and more to specialise in certain branches of industry, such as textiles and clothing, electronics, the food industry etc. Which branches were to be dominant in which country depended on the special circumstances of the country in question, the principal ones being its specific geographical location and the competi- tivity of its capital in these branches. The capitalist world crisis is, among other things, the forceful assertion of this new development in the inter- national divison of labour and a process through which the barriers erected by the old mode of accumulation are to be eliminated.
These aspects of the crisis are, of course, no more than tendencies and the contradictory nature of the development in various countries is but another expression of the inherently contradictory nature of capitalist accumulation. Such were the coordinates of the critical situation in which the Turkish bourgeoisie found itselfin the late s.
The crisis was the expression of the inability of Turkish capital to reproduce itself as a fraction of world capital. Therefore, the internal crisis was also immediately a crisis of the relations of Turkish capitalism to world capitalism. A durable solution to this multi-dimensional crisis pointed to a reorientation in capital accumulation and to a new mode of insertion into the international division oflabour. The internal and the external dimensions of the crisis were hence indissociable.
This is what created the illusion, popular in left-wing circles in Turkey, that the neo-liberal programme of economic policy adopted in January was simply the result of the dictates of the International Monetary Fund. Certainly, Turkey's high level of in debt- edness did make governments vulnerable to IMF pressures.
But the principal social force behind the radical turn in economic policy that came at the beginning of was not the IMF, but the Turkish financial and industrial bourgeoisie now united around this programme.
The IMF was instrumental in transmitting to Turkey the requirements of the new international division of labour. But where it concretely determined the development of events was in its insistence on capitalist discipline over an ailing economy. It thereby tremendously strengthened the Turkish bour- geoisie in its quest for ideological hegemony. The neo-liberal programme incarnated in the January measures aimed at a profound restructuring of productive capital in order to render its structure consistent with a new mode of accumulation oriented towards a deeper insertion of the economy within the new international division oflabour.
This programme, which has been and is being applied to different degrees in many other underdeveloped countries, has several dimensions:. Basing itself on the categorical assertion that the unhampered working of the market mechanism i. Measures that go in this direction include the abolition of price controls over the private sector, the alignment of the prices of the products of public enter- prises to their market prices, projects for the reorganisation of public enterprises with a view to render them more susceptible to capitalist rationality, the liberalisation, to a certain extent, of interest rates and the exchange rate, the priority given to the formation of a capital market - an aspect which had lagged hopelessly behind in the development of Turkish capitalism.
Despite the glorification of market forces, neo-liberal strategy could certainly not have dispensed with the powerful tool that public investment has traditionally been in Turkey, making for half of all investment, this ratio rising to two thirds in the last couple of years in the context of the sharp decline in private investment. Public investment was, therefore, used as a privileged instrument in the restructuring of the Turkish economy.
The RPP government which had preceded it since December had had to resort to stabilisation measures accompanied by currency devaluations successively in April and March-June These measures of the RPP government were criticised by spokesmen for the bourgeoisie as being too late, too meek and half-hearted. The important point to retain is, however, that the ;RPP policies, adopted under the twin fires of the IMF and the Turkish monopoly bourgeoisie, already pointed in the direction of the January measures and constituted a watershed that separated the post government policies of austerity and the reflationary policies up until the end of But there were certain crucial measures which were integral to the success of the neo-liberal programme which it could simply not push through.
Of primary importance was the necessity of the imposition of a harsh austerity on the industrial working class and other labouring strata unproductive workers, public employees etc. The resistance of the working class to the austerity programme, manifested in the extent of industrial disputes in , precluded this. There are varying figures as to the number of strikes and of workers involved in the last few years of the decade. But all concur to show that there was a dramatic rise of trade union activity in According to one source, 42 approximately 85 thousand workers went on strike in , but many strikes being postponed by the government on various ludicrous pretexts, the real figure would be some thousand.
This is nearly four times the number of strikers for and incomparably higher than the quite calm It was also nearly three times the figure for , which itself was an all- time historical'high. A second aspect difficult to put into effect was the imperative to keep the support prices of agricultural commodities down. This would have been contradictory with the fundamental strategy that the JP had been following in the s: having drawn the lessons of the split at the end of the s, the leadership followed a policy of close alliance with the rural bourgeoisie and big landlords.
Moreover the rural petty-bourgeoisie was the vast reservoir of support for this party and could not be alienated only a year and a half before elections. Finally, the taxation system had to be radically altered. Decades of constant compromise with the rural propertied classes resulting in the practical exemption of agriculture from taxation had finally put industrial capital itself in a difficult situation through the inevitable rise in the taxes paid by wage-earners.
This created a heavy burden for private big firms in the form of higher gross wages under the pressure of inflation. But again if this burden were to be alleviated, it had to be shifted to other classes and strata, and agriculture being ruled out, this meant alienating sizeable sections of other fractions of capital and the urban petty- bourgeoisie. In short, the new orientation of the Turkish bourgeoisie created formidable tensions among the various classes and strata of the society, tensions difficult, if not impossible, to master within the confines of the parliamentary form of domination.
In the atmosphere of political turmoil and mass terror of the late s, unpopular measures on such an exten- sive scale would almost certainly have been suicidal for the government. The last resort within the limits of parliamentary democracy seemed to be a 'grand coalition' of the main and 'responsible' bourgeois parties, the JP and the RPP. This had the double advantage of uniting the deeply divided forces of the monopoly bourgeoisie and bringing under its hegemony the various classes and strata that were controlled by these parties. Even this solution was not without its risks: it could have radicalised the electorate and pushed a sizeable portion of the discontented towards either the myriad left-wing movements to the left of the RPP or to the fascist NAP which never gained the full confidence and endorsement of the big bourgeoisie because of its extremely danger- ous strategy of civil war.
It could also have strenghtened the NSP, by now a nightmare for monopoly capital and for US imperialism. Uncer- tain as its outcome may have been, it was nonetheless the only solution in sight and an increasing pressure was brought to bear on the two parties by the representatives of the bourgeoisie.
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But because of the deep polarisation of the society since the beginning of the decade and of the irreconcilability of the different interests represented by the two parties, notwithstanding their common allegiance to the industrial bourgeoisie, this hegemonic 'united front' of the big bourgeoisie turned out to be impossible to realise.
This exhausted the possibilities under parliamentary rule. For the third time in its brief historical existence, the big industrial bourgeoisie was thus compelled, under the force of class 'struggle, to tie its fate to military rule. The military dictatorship established by the coup of 12 September can hence be described as the repressive united front of the big bourgeoisie.